RECENT CASES.
BILLS

AND

NOTES-NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS-FLLING IN BLANKS-A

promissory note was delivered with a blank space for the amount of the attorney's fees, in case of confession of judgment. Held: The holder had implied authority to fill up the blanks. Kramer v. Schnitzer, iog N. E. 695 (Ill.
1915).

It is a settled principle of commercial law that when instruments in
blank are completed by the holder, the maker becomes absolutely liable.
Roth v. Donnelly, 8 Ga. App. 851 (igio). The presence of the signature
gives the holder implied authority to fill up the blanks. Johnston v. Hoover,
139 Ia. 147 (i9o8). Moreover, the maker is liable to an innocent third person, though the blanks were fraudulently filled by a prior holder, some
courts placing his liability on the ground of implied authority. Geddes v.
Blackmore, 132 Ind. 551 (1892).
Most courts, however, rely on the theory
of estoppel and negligence.

Gillespie v. Rogers, 184 Pa. 488 (1898).

These

rules, well recognized in the law merchant, have been approved by the Negotiable Instruments Law. Sec. 14 provides that the holder of a negotiable
instrument "has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the
blanks therein," if filled up "in accordance with the authority given and
within a reasonable time." Houston v. Day, 145 Mo. App. 410 (1909).
If
"it is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for all
purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up
strictly in accordance with the authority given, and within a reasonable
time." Hartington Nat. Bank v. Breslin, 128 N. W. 659 (Neb. igio) See
also Equitable Trust Co. v. Lyons, 129 N. Y. S. (i9II).
CARlERS-INJuRIES TO PASSENGER-MENTAL SUFFERING--Two intoxicated

and boisterous men were locked by the conductor in the toilet of a
passenger train, where they cursed and swore in the hearing of a lady passenger. Held: She could recover for the fright and shock. Seaboard Air
Line Rwy. Co. v. Mobley, 69 So. 614 (Ala. 1915).
A carrier is bound to use all reasonable precautions of which human
judgment and foresight are capable to make a passenger's journey safe and
comfortable. -Dwinelle v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 12o N. Y. 117 (189o).
It must use the highest degree of care reasonably practicable to protect its
passengers from insult and injury by fellow-passengers. Lucy v. Chicago,
etc., Rwy. Co., 64 Minn. 7 (896).
A railway company is liable to a passenger for mental suffering, unaccompanied by physical pain, caused by vulgar,
profane and indecent language of others permitted to remain on the cars
with the passenger. Houston, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Perkins, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 5o8
(1899). The carrier is not liable for injuries inflicted by one passenger upon
another under such unusual circumstances, that the servants of the carrier
could not possibly have prevented them. Segal v. St. L., etc., Rwy. Co., 8o
S. W. Rep. 233 (Tex. 19o4). But where the indignity offered the passenger might reasonably have been anticipated, it becomes the duty of those in
charge of the train to exercise the utmost vigilance to prevent it, and failure
to do so will make the carrier liable. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Finn, 16 Ky.
L. R. 57 (1894). The measure of care which a carrier must exercise may
vary according to time and place. Thus, a carrier owes a higher degree of
care toward an actual passenger on a train, than toward a prospective passenger waiting in a station. Nashville, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Crosby, 183 Ala.
237 (1913).
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RECENT CASES
CARRIERS-WHAT Is BACGA:FC?-Amoig the clontents of a passenger's
trunk, lost by a carrier, was a butter knife. Held: This was not such "baggage" as to make the carrier liable for its loss. Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Fletcher, 69 So. Rep. 634 (Ala. 1915).
The decision in the principal case is based on the well-established rule
that "baggage" consists of whatever a passenger takes with him for his own
personal use and convenience, according to the habits and wants of the particular class to which he belongs, either with reference to the immediate
necessities or to the ultimate purposes of the journey. Chicago R. I. & P.
R. Co. v. Whitten, 90 Ark. 462 (igo9) ; New York Cent. R. Co. v. Fraloff,
IOO U. S. 24 (1879). Thus articles for use in housekeeping after the journey's
end are not baggage. Macrow v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 6 Q_ B. 612
(1871); McCaffrey v. Canadian P. R. Co., I Manitoba L. Rep. 350 (1884);
Davidson v. Cunard S. S. Co., 118 N. Y. Supp. 929 (igog). But bedding belonging to a poor man, who is moving with his family, has been held to be
baggage on the ground that this is both customary and necessary. Ouimet
v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 605 (i861). This has even been extended to include cutlery and dishes. Parmelee v. Fischer, 22 Ill. 212 (1859) ; but these cases
seem to be contra to the weight of authority. However, if a carrier receives
household goods or merchandise as personal baggage, knowing their true
character, it will be liable for such articles as for baggage. Mauritz v. N.
Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., 23 Fed. 765 (1885) ; Minter v. Pacific R. Co., 41 Mo.
503 (1867).
See also Elliot on Railroads, § 1646. Although many cases
have held that the question, what is baggage, is one of fact for the jury,
Merrill v. Grinnell, 3o N. Y. 504 (1864) ; New York Cent. R. Co. v. Fraloff,
supra; Ouimet v. Henshaw, supra; yet it must be understood that this is
the case only when there is uncertainty or dispute as to some fact upon
which the whole question may turn. Otherwise it is strictly a question of
law for the court. 3 Hutchinson on Carriers § 1255.
For a complete discussion of this subject see 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 634.
CIVIL PROCEDURE-SuRvIVAL-BREACH OF PRoMIsE-Relying upon a promise to marry, a milliner gave up her business. but no marriage took place.
An action was brought, but before the trial the defendant died and his
executor was joined. Held: The action could not be maintained against the
executor. Quirk v. Thomas, 113 L. T. 239 (Eng. 1915).
The principal case is in accord with the English and American cases.
Finlay v. Chirney. 20 Q. B. Div. 494 (Eng. r888) ; Hayden v. Vreeland, 37 N. J_
L. 372 (1875) ; French v. Seamens, 5o N. Y. S. 776 (1898) ; Lattimore v. Simmons, 13 S. & R. 185 (Pa. 1825). It has been held, however, that the action
does not abate. Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91 (1882). After the death of the defendant no amendment can be made to alter the form of action. Smith v.
Sherman, 58 Mass. 408 (1849). At common law all actions except real actions
abated on the death of the party, but statutes remedied this as to contract actions. However, though a promise to marry is sued upon as a contract action, i. e., assumpsit, Donovan v. Folly, 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 91 (1895),
yet it is regarded as a personal action, and the statutes do not embrace it.
Wade v. Kabbfleish, 58 N. Y. 282 (1874); Hayden v. Vreeland, supra. Its
peculiarity lies in the fact that the injury to be compensated is personal and
so the same rule of damages is applicable as in actions ex delicto. Damages
are given for injured feelings and anxiety of mind. Harrison v. Swift, 95
Mass. 144 (1866).
CONTRACTS-MISTAKE OF

LAw-A lessee in a suit for rent declared that

the lease of four tracts of land was the result of accident or mistake, claimed
title to one of the four tracts at the time of its execution, and demanded reimbursement for the payments of rent therefor. Held: The lessor could
recover the entire rent. Clark v. Lehigh, etc., Co., 25o Pa. 304 (T1I5).
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The general rule, ignorantia legis zenzinem excusat, has been universally followed in criminal cases with apparent rather than real exceptions.
On the application of the rule to civil cases, however, the courts have differed widely, the great weight of authority holding with the principal case,
that ignorance of the law is no ground for relief from the obligation of a
contract. Prescott v. Cooper Bank, 37 La. Ann. 5.53 (i885); Lazaraus v.
Lehigh Coal Co., 246 Pa. 178 (i014).
See also .5 COL. L. Rav. 25 (i9o5), and
8 COL. L. REV. 486 (0o8). Other courts, however, have confined the term
"legis" or "juris" in the maxim to mistakes of the general rules of law, not
to errors of the parties as to their own private legal rights or interests.
Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149, 170 (Eng. 1867); Burton v. Haden. 6o
S. E. 736 (Va. i9o8); Alabama, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Jones, 73 Miss. Ino
(1895). In such cases the contract will be set aside as made under mutual
mistake as to the relative rights of the parties. In cases of great hardship or
where the adverse party would obtain an unconscionable advantage, equity
may afford relief, Mackey v. Smith, 67 Pac. 982 (Wash. 19o2) ; but between
the border of great hardship and actual fraud there are many contracts made
in ignorance of the law which will be enforced. Morris v. Crowe, 2o6 Pa. 438
(1903). Whether in such cases the mistake is one of law or of fact is not
uniformly treated by the cases. Fink v. Smith, 170 Pa. 124 (1885).
The dictum of the court in the principal case as to the construction of the
"coal lease" is of the utmost importance as throwing light upon a very much
confused and controverted question. For a full discussion of this subject see
64 UNIV. OF PENNA. L. REv. 42 (igis).
CONTRACTS-PERFORMANCE-IMPOSSIBILrTY-Where

a contract called for

the use of crushed local sandstone of a certain quality, it was found after
part performance that the specified material did not exist in sufficient quantities. Held: The contractor was relieved of his obligation to perform.
Jewett v. Sayre, iog N. E. 636 (Ohio 1915).
The general rule is that a man who voluntarily contracts without qualification is not excused because of inevitable accident or other contingency
not foreseen, which makes performance impossible. Lorillard v. Clyde, 142
N. Y. 456 (1894). The theory is that such a doctrine protects the integrity
of contracts. A distinction was early made between obligations imposed by
law and those voluntarily assumed on the principle that in the latter the
party can expressly provide against contingencies. Paradin v. Jane, Aleyn
26 (i681). But this doctrine has been generally held not to apply where performance depended upon the existence of a given thing and such existence,
or continued existence, was the assumed basis of the agreement, when in
fact there was no existence. Walker v. Tucker, 70 Ill. 527 (1873) ; Bruce v.
Indianapolis Gas Co,, 46 Ind. App. 193 (1910). It is witllin this principle
that the court placed the principal case. It also operates where the thing
existed but was destroyed. Outfitting Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 237 Ill.
61o (i9o8) ; Dixon v. Breon, 22 Pa. Super. Ct. 340 (1903). It is similar to
the continued existence of a particular person. Robinson v. Davis, L. R. 6
Exch. 268 (Eng. 1871). Though this principle is sometimes termed an exception to the general rule, the better view is that the relief is afforded upon
the construction of the contract. The condition is implied that the parties
contracted on the existence or continued existence of a particular thing.
Dexter v. Norton, 4 N. Y. 62 (1871). The rule has been held not to apply
where the thing destroyed is the thing which one of the parties has expressly
contracted to produce and deliver. Logan v. Gas Co., 95 N. Y. Supp. 163
(1go5).
CONTRACTS-UNCERTAINTY-MUTUALITY-A manufacturer contracted with
a dealer to supply him at specified prices with such quantity of fur coats as
should be required by his business during the next season. Held: The contract was not void for uncertainty or want of mutuality. Scott v. Stevenson
Co., 153 N. W. 316 (Minn. i915).

RECENT CASES
The rules applicable to contracts for the supply of such materials as one
may need in his business for a specified time, may be stated thus: If the
quantity to be delivered is conditioned by the will, wish or want of one of
the parties it is void for want of consideration and mutuality; but it may be
sustained if the quantity is ascertainable otherwise with reasonable certainty. So an accepted offer to sell or deliver articles at specified prices during a limited time in quantities as the acceptor may want or desire in his
business, is lacking in mutuality behause the acceptor is not bound to want
or desire any of the articles. Cold Blast Co. v. Kansas City Bolt Co., 114
Fed. 417 (19o2); Higbie v. Rust, 211 111. 333 (1904). Accepted orders for
goods under such void contracts constitute sales of the goods thus ordered,
but they do not validate the contract as to future orders. Crane v. Crane
& Co., lO5 Fed. 86g (19O1). On the other hand, the decided weight of authority holds that an accepted offer to furnish such articles as shall be
needed, required, or consumed by the established business of the acceptor
during a limited time is binding. Minn. Lumber Co. v. Coal Co., i6o Ill. 85
(1896); Lima Co. v. Casting Co., 155 Fed. 77 ('19o7) ; Secor v. Ardsley Ice
Co., 117 N. Y. Supp. 414 (igog). Nor can the acceptor escape his obligation
by a change in his business which will appreciably affect his needs. Mc-

Keever v. Cononsburg Co., 138 Pa. 184 (i89o). He is bound to so conduct
his business in the future as to need substantially the same amount of materials as in the past. Hickey v. O'Brien, 123 Mich. 6ii (igoo); Wells v.
Alexander, 13o N. Y. 642 (i89i).
EQUITY JURISDICTION-INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN ENFORCEMENT OF A
STATUTE-A bill was filed to enjoin the cancellation of liquor licenses under
a statute requiring dealers to pay an agency license for distributing brewery
products manufactured in another state. Held: Equity should intervene if

the enforcement of the statute would result in injury to the property rights
of the complainant, or abridge his rights under the federal Constitution.
Evansville Brewing Ass'n v. Excise Commission, 225 Fed. 204 (Ala. i915).
The general rule is that an injunction will not issue to restrain the enforcement of the criminal law. Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Morehead, 83
S. E. 259 (N. C. 1914). The fact that a statute is unconstitutional gives
equity no ground for interference. Brown v. State, 59 Wash. 195 (igio);
nor that the complainant would be injured by its enforcement. Benz v.
Kremer, i42 Wis. I (igio). But the courts generally are inclined to make
an exception where the enforcement of an invalid statute would do irreparable injury to property rights. Sherod v. Aitchison, ra Pac. 351 (Ore.
1914): or where the complainant would have no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law, Ewing v. Webster, 103 Iowa, 226 (1897) ; or where constitutional rights are abridged, as in the principal case; or to avoid multiplicity
of actions. Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 (i898). The exceptions however,
are not universally recognized. Equitable relief is frequently withheld on
the general ground of lack of jurisdiction in criminal matters, and because
an adequate remedy exists at law. Cobb v. French, iII Minn. 429 (i9io);
Winn v. Dyess, x67 S. W. 294 (Tex. 1914). Nor have some courts feared the
oppressiveness of a multiplicity of suits. Montgomery v. West, 146 Aa.
68o (9o6).
EVIDENC--PAROL AGREEMENT TO VARY LEAsE-A lease contained a pro-

vision that the lessee would deliver up the premises in the condition in which
he received them but there was a parol agreement that he should have the
right to remove certain fixtures. Held: The parol agreement was inadmissible. Hamilton v. Fleck, 244 Pa. 6o7 (915).
The weight of authority is that a parol agreement cannot be proved to
vary the terms of a lease. Stephen v. Ely, io2 N. Y. 79 (i9oo) ; Noble v.
Bosworth, i9 Pick. 314 (Mass. 1857); Wadleigh v. Janvrin, 41 N. H. 503
(i866). Some courts, however, hold that as long as the paroL-agreement
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does not vary the written terms of the lease it may be offered in evidence.
South Balto. Co.v. Mulbach, 69 Md. 395 (1888) ; McCracken v. Hall, 7 Ind.
30 (1855). The reason for the rule is put by some courts on the ground
that parol evidence is not admissible to vary or add to terms of a written
contract. Naurmberg v. Young, 44 N. J. L. 331 (1882). Some courts hold
that a parol agreement as to fixtures will not be enforced because of the
Statute of Frauds. Home v. Smith, 1O5 N. C. 322 (18go). In other states-a
contract for the sale of fixtures does not come within the Statute of Frauds.
Pea v. Pea, 35 Ind. 387 (1872); Balto. Co. v. Mulbach, supra. It has been
held that a parol agreement for the reservation of a house from a deed may
not be shown 'in evidence, while a parol reservation of a cotton gin-may be
shown. Smith v. Ogden, 63 Ga. 499 (1879). A parol agreement by the lindlord that any buildings which the lessee might erect in the future may be
removed has been held valid. Dubois v. Kelly, IO Barb. 496 (N. Y. 1851).
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION oF LEGITIMACY-A man and his wife were living separately by agreement,, when the defendant was indicted for adultery
alleged to have resulted' in the birth of a child to the wife. Want o- access
by the husband was proved only beyond a reasonable doubt. Held: Evidence
of the birth of the child was admissible. State v. Shaw, 94 Atl. 434 (Vt.

1915).

The principal case is in accord with the weight of authority. Timmann v.

Timmann, 142 N. Y. Supp. 298

(I913); Phillips v. Allen, 84 Mass. 453

(I86r) ; Ortwein v. Thomas, 127 III. 554 (1887). Sometimes. it is held that
it must be evidence satisfactory to the jury. Banbury Peerage Case, I Sim &
Stu. 153 (Eng. 18II) ; Ewell v. Ewell, 137 N. W. 55 (Mich. 1912) ; or that

it must be. clear and conclusive evidence. Kleinert v. Ehlers, 38 Pa. 439
(188i)
; Wallace v. Wallace, 73 N. J. E. 402 (1907) ; Kennedy v. Sta:e, 173 S.
W. 842 (Ark. 1915). Even a preponderance of evidence has been considered
sufficient. Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. I55 (1852); Wilson v. Babb, I8 S. C. 59
(i882). On the other hand it has been deemed necessary to establish the
impossibility of access. Bunel v. O'Day, 123 Fed. 317 (19o3); Watts v.
Owens, 62 Wis. 512 (1885) ; State v. Lavin, 8o Ia. 333 (189o).
MASTER AND SERvANT-ScoPE OF EMPLOYMENT-A chauffeur, who on his
way to the garage after the day's work, stopped to fix a tire and had his
clothes drenched by rain, drove to his home, changed his clothes, had supper
and returned to the garage. On the way back he made a side trip of a few
blocks for some cigars, and on this trip ran over the plaintiff's sons. Held:
The master was liable. Blaker v. Phila. Elec. Co., 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 56 (I915).
Acts done in furtherance of the master's business and authorized by
him either expressly or by implication, are within the scope of the servant's
employment. Roberts v. Railroad, 143 N. C. 176 (i9o6); Steele v. May, 135
Ala. 483 (19o2). Where the facts are disputed, or where more than one inference may be drawn from the same facts, the question of the scope of authority is for the jury. Brennan v. Merchant, 2o5 Pa. 158 (1o3) ; Sharp v.
Railroad, 184 N. Y. ioo (i9o6). In the principal case the court held that
it 'Might be inferred that the act of the chauffeur in driving home was as
much for the benefit of the master as for his own, since it was necessary for
the efficient performance of his duty that he should be in good physical condition. The deviation for the cigars was not sufficient to take the servant
out of the scope of employment. A mere deviation from the strict course of
duty, even for the servant's own purposes will not always relieve the master.
Ritchie v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155 (1893); Joel v. Morrison, 6 Carr & P. 5O1
(Eng. 1834).
This line of cases depends chiefly on the facts of each case. The principal case is illustrative of one set of circumstances. Cf. Provo v. Conrad,
153 N. W. 753 (Minn. I915), 64 UNIv. OF PENNA. L. REv. 102.

RECENT CASES
MEASURE OF DAMAGES-WRONGFUL EXTRACTION OF OIL-A life tenant of
oil lands not previously explored, leased the oil on a royalty basis. The
remaindermen brought suit for an accounting. Held: The measure of
damages is a sum equal to the royalties provided. Findley v. Warren, 248 Pa.

315 (1915).

Where oil has been taken wrongfully under a mistaken belief as to
the right to do so, the courts agree that the measure of damages is the value
of the oil in situ. Kalile v. Crown Oil Co., Ioo N. E. 681 (Ind. 1913). This is
true both in case of waste, Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562 (1897), and
trespass, Bender v. Brooks, 1O3 Tex. 329 (191o). This value is usually ascertained by taking the market price of the oil at the surface less the cost of
production. Crawford v. Forest Oil Co., 2o8 Pa. 5 (19o4) ; Gladys City Oil,
etc., Co. v. Right of Way Oil Co., 137 S. W.

7r (Tex. 1911). Under this

view it has been held that the value of the oil at the surface will be charged
where the defendant does not plead nor prove the cost of extraction. Right
of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, etc., Co., 157 S. W. 737 (Tex. 1913). But
the usual royalty has been adopted in case of special circumstances, as where
the oil was taken under a void lease that provided such royalties. Turner v.
Seep, 167 Fed. 646 (Igog), modified on other grounds, 179 Fed. 74 (1g9o).
NEGLIGENCE-DRIVER'S

FAULT

IMPUTED

To GUEST-A

guest in an auto-

mobile was injured in a collision due to the concurrent negligence of the
driver and another motorist. Held: The negligence of the driver was not to
be imputed to the guest. Hackworth v. Ashby, 178 S.W. 1074 (Ky. 1915).
The principal case is in accord with the general rule that the negligence
of the driver of a vehicle will not be imputed to a passenger who exercises
no control over the driver. Littlefield v. Gilman, 207 Mass. 539 (911);
Terwilliger v. Railroad, 152 App. Div. 168 (N. Y. 1912). Michigan and Wisconsin are apparently the only jurisdictions holding contra to the general rule.
Granger v. Farrant, 179 Mich. 19 (1914) ; Lanson v. Fon du Lac, 141 Wis. 5
(19o9). But where the passenger has full knowledge of the danger and voluntarily incurs the risk, he may be guilty of contributory negligence. Rebillard v. Railroad, 133 C. C. A. 9 (914), where an automobile without lights
proceeded along a bad road; Jefson v. Railway, 72 Misc. 103 (N. Y. I911),
where an automobile went fifty miles an hour without protest from the
guest. The passenger must exercise due care for his own safety. Failure
to do so constitutes contributory negligence. Senft v. Western Md. Rwy. Co.,
246 Pa. 446 (1914); United Rwys. v. Crain, 123 Md. 332 (1914).
PROPERTY-COVENANTS

RUNNING WITH THE LAND--A

lessee covenanted

not to assign without the consent of the lessor. With lessor's consent the
lessee assigned, and the assignee then sought to assign without consent from
the original lessor. Held: Covenants restricting assignment run with the land
and bind the assignees even though they are not named. Re Stephenson Co.,
113 L. T. 230 (Eng. 1915).
The principal case is in accord with the English cases. Williams v. Earle,
ig L. T. 238 (Eng. 1868) ; McCacken v. Colton, 85 L. T. 594 (Eng. 19o2). In
the United States the prevailing opinion is that such covenants do not bind
the assignee. McCormick v. Stowell, 138 Mass. 43r (1885); Dougherty v.
Mathers, 35 Mo. 520 (1865). Some States, however, follow the English rule.
Keu v. Trainor, 15o Ill. 150 (1894) ; Brolasky v. Hood, 6 Phila. 193 (Pa. 1866).

In order that a covenant may run with the land its performance or nonperformance must affect the nature, quality or value of the property or must
affect the mode of enjoyment. Norman v. Wells, i7 Wend. 136 (N. Y. 1837).
The word "assigns" need not be mentioned in covenants running with the land.
Conover v. Smith, 17 N. J. Eq. 51 (1864). An exception has been made where
the covenant relates to a thing not in esse. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16 a (Eng.
1583) ; but this doctrine has been repudiated. Minshull v. Oakes, 2 H. and M.
793 (Eng. 1864); Oil Co. v. Blair, 113 Pa. 83 (1886).
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PROPERTY-GIFrs-CERTIFICATE oF STOCK-A certificate of stock was
assigned to a third person, to be delivered by him to the donee upon the death
of the donor. Held: This was a valid gift inter vivos. Innes v. Potter, 153
N. W. 604 (Minn. 1915).
An expectant interest in personal property was not formerly recognized,
and it is well settled that a verbal promise to give goods in the future at the
death of the intended donor passes no title and confers no rights in the
intended donee. Bruce v. Squires, 68 Kan. I99 (i9o4). To constitute a valid
gift, it must go into effect immediately, and must pass entirely beyond the
control of the donor. Snyder v. Snyder, 131 Mich. 658 (r9o2). There must
therefore be a delivery, but it is sufficient if the delivery is made to a third
person in trust for the donee, Snyder v. Frank, ioi N. E. 684 (Ind. 1913).
In such a case it is immaterial that the beneficial enjoyment of the donee is
jostponed until the death of the donor. Jones v. Nichols, i3o N. W. 125 (Ia.
I91i). This rule applies even though the interest is retained by the donor
during his life. Tucker v. Tucker, 138 Iowa, 344 (igo8). But if the third
person is merely the donor's agent, the death of the donor before delivery
to the donee revokes the agency, and the gift is defeated. Grant Trust &
Savings Co. v. Tucker, 96 N. E. 487 (Ind. 1911).
PaoPxrTY-Grrs Ixva Vivos-DEuvERu-A cheque was deposited to the
joint account of two persons, and the question arose as to whether there had
been a valid gift to the one who actually deposited the cheque, from the one to
whose order the cheque was drawn. Held: The issuance of a pass-book, and
its delivery by the bank to one joint depositor, is not sufficient delivery to
deprive the other depositor of his dominion over the account. Hunt v. Naylor,
95 AUt. 138 (N. J. 1915).
To constitute a valid gift there must be coupled with the intention of the
donor a delivery of the property to the donee or his agent. Irons v. Smallpiece, 2 B. & Aid. 551 (Eng. 18ig) ; Mahan v. U. S., I6 Wall. i43 (U. S. 1872) ;
Buswell v. Fuller, i56 Mass. 3o9 (1892) ; Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177 (1888).
The delivery must be absolute. Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. 455
(i89i); Young v. Young, 8o N. Y. 422 (i88o); Walsh's Appeal, supra. As
far as the nature of the property allows the delivery should be actual.
McHugh v. O'Connor, 9I Ala. 243 (i89o); Brown v. Brown's Adm'r, 43 Ky.
535 (1844). But ownership may pass to the donee by constructive delivery.
Theological Seminary v. Robins, 128 Ind. 85 (r89i); Vosburg v. Mallory, 135
N. W. 577 (Ia. I912); Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524 (1898). Where the
donee is already in possession a re-delivery to the donor is not necessary to
constitute a valid gift, if the intention of the donor is expressed. Tenbrook
v. Brown, 17 Ind. 410 (i86i) ; Osgood v. Carter, Iio Me. 55o (1913) ; Miller
v. Neff's Adm'r, 33 W. Va. I97 (:1889). Delivery of a bank book by the
donor is sufficient to make a valid gift inter vivos of the deposit, if that intent
is present. Appeal of Guinan, 70 Conn. 342 (I898); Polley v. Hicks, 58
Ohio St. 218 (i898) ; Watson v. Watson, 69 Vt. 243 (z896). But cf. Wilson v.
Featherston, 122 N. C. 747 (1898).
PRoPERTY - TnEATRES - REFUSAL oF ADmissIOx - Theatrical managers
threatened to eject a dramatic critic from their theatres on the ground that
his attendance was for the purpose of writing adverse criticisms. Held: An
injunction should be granted. Woolcott v. Shubert et al., 154 N. Y. Supp.
754 (1915).
At common law the theatre was a strictly private concern and one arbitrarily refused a ticket had no remedy. Burton v. Scherpf, i Allen 133 (Mass.
i86I). A card of admission to a place of public amusement was a mere
license and revocable. Wood v. Leadbitter, i3 M. & W. 837 (Eng. 1845). The
person ejected could recover the price paid and the expenses incurred on the
faith of the ticket in a contract action, but he had no remedy in tort for the
humiliation and inconvenience suffered. Horney v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 2o (i9o5).

RECENT CASES
The private character of such tickets is still recognized by the courts and
reasonable stipulations are upheld. Collister v. Hayman, 183 N. Y. 250 (1905).
But the doctrine of Wood v. Leadbitter, supra, has been recently criticised,
63 UNIv. oF PENNA. LAw REv Ew, 223 (1914), and has been definitely overruled. Hurst v. Pictures Theatre, 3o T. L. R. 642 (Eng. 1914). The same
result has been achieved by statute in many of the states. Cal. St. 1893, c. i85;
and discrimination in the sale of such tickets on ground of race, color or
creed, has been forbidden. N. Y. Civil Rights Law, Laws I9w9, c. 14, Consol.
Laws, c. 6, Laws 1913, c. 265. These statutes have been declared constitutional as within the police power of the state, Western Turf Association v.
Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359 (1907) ; and as not creating an action for damages,
but merely enlarging the remedy. Woolcott v. Shubert, supra. Under such
acts recovery can be had not only on the contract, but in a tort action for any
damage or humiliation suffered, either because of a refusal to sell a ticket,
Davis v. Tacoma R. and Power Co., 35 Wash. 203 (i9o4); or because of its
revocation after sale. Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351 (91).
SALES-RETENTION OF POSSESSION BY VENDOR-A purchaser 1eft some
barrels of sugar in the possession of the vendor, where they were levied on
by creditors of the latter. Held: The creditors were entitled to the sugar.
Brooklyn Cooperage Co. v. Cora Planting and Mfg. Co., 69 So. 195 (La. 1915).
The retention of possession by the seller after an absolute sale was early
considered to be one of "the signs and marks of fraud" within the Statute of
13th Elizabeth. Twyne's Case. I Smith's Leading Cases, I (Eng. 1585).
It has continued so ever since, though as to its conclusiveness the courts have
not been able to agree. The early English rule regarded it as conclusive evidence of fraud. Edwards v. Harben, 2 T. R. 587 (Eng. 1788); but this
decision was soon overruled. Martindale v. Booth, 3 Barn. & Ad. 498 (Eng.
1832). It is now well settled in England that retention of possession by the
seller is, at most, evidence tending to show fraud. Hale v. Metropolitan Co.,
28 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 777 (Eng. 1859); Alton v. Harrison, L. R. 4, Ch. App.
622 (Eng. i869). The early English rule was at one time followed in the
federal courts. Hamilton v. Russel, I Cranch 309 (U. S. i8o3) ; but has been
abandoned. Warner v. Norton, 61 U. S. 448 (1857). In some of the states
it is regarded as conclusive evidence of fraud. McKibbin v. Martin, 64 Pa.
352 (I87O) ; Lovejoy v. Raymond, 127 Ill. App. 5x9 (i9o6) ; but in most jurisdictions it is but prima facie evidence. Ingalls v. Herrick, io8 Mass. 351
(871) ; Collins v. Taggart, 57 Ga. 355 (876) ; Harris v. Chaffee, 21 At. xo4
(R. I. i8go). In several states this question is now regulated by statutes
which as a rule declare that such sales are merely prima facie evidence of
fraud and may be rebutted. Barr v. Church, 52 N. W. 591 (Wis. 1892);
Schidlower v. McCafferty, 83 N. Y. Suppl. 391 (19o3). The principal case
holds that a mere constructive delivery is insufficient to destroy the presumption. Some cases hold otherwise. Ingalls v. Herrick, supra. In Pennsylvania and those states which maintain that such transactions are fraudulent
per se, an actual delivery must be shown if the goods sold are capable of
such delivery. Dewart v. Clement, 48 Pa. 413 (1864); McKibbin v. Martin,
supra. But retention of possession by the vendor at a sheriff's sale is not
even presumptively fraudulent. Myers v. Harvey, 2 Pen. and W. 478
(Pa. 1831).
SURETYSHIP-DISCHARGE-NoICE OF DEFAuLT OF PRINCIPAL-A treasurer
of the plaintiff corporation admitted a shortage in accounts, but none of the
directors had actual knowledge of any dishonesty. The treasurer had in fact
made a large defalcation. Held: The fact that the surety received no notice
of the shortage would not discharge him, as constructive knowledge of the default imposed no duty on the corporation to give notice. Wait v. Homestead
Bldg. Assn., 85 S. E. 637 (W. Va. 1915).
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As a general rule, a surety is not entitled to notice from an obligee upon
a default of the principal. Welch v. Walsh, 59 N. E. 44o (Mass. igio) ; but
where an employer takes a continuing bond of indemnity conditioned for the
faithful performance of an employee, he impliedly stipulates that he will not
retain such employee after a breach of guaranty. Phillips v. Foxhall, L. R.
7, Q. B. 666 ('Eng. 1872) ; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Rapp, 113 Ill. 390 (i885).
However, the employer must have actual knowledge of the wrongdoing, and
it is not sufficient that the default might have been discovered by an investigation. Tapley v. Martin, 116 Mass. 275 (1874); Wayne v. Commercial
Bank, 52 Pa. 343 (i866). Mere inaction of the obligee will not discharge the
surety unless it amounts to fraud or concealment. Watertown Ins. Co. v.
Simmons, 131 Mass. 85 (i88i). The default of which the employer is required to notify the surety must "amount to actual dishonesty. Charlotte
Rwy. Co. v. Gaw, 59 Ga. 685 (1877); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Fowler, io8 Mich.
557 (1896). Even where the bond calls for immediate notice, the company
need not act on mere suspicion, but is entitled to reasonable time to investigate whether actual default has been made. Bank of Tarboro v. Deposit
Co., 128 N. C. 366 (igoi).

Where the employer is a corporation the duty of giving notice upon
default of an employee is not so clearly defined, and the cases are in conflict.
Where the president and other officers have knowledge of a default, the
surety should be notified and it is not necessary that the directors officially
have knowledge. Life Insurance Co. v. Scott, 8i Ky. 54o (1884). Knowledge of an employee with regard to a matter covered by his employment is
regarded as knowledge on the part of the directors. Saint v. Wheeler &
Wilson, 95 Ala. 362 (i89i). On the other hand, a number of states, following the decision of the principal case, say that a company is not bound by
constructive knowledge of a default and that the failure of one officer to
give notice of such default will not relieve the sureties from liability. U. S.
v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 7o (U. S. 1824) ; Fidelity Co. v. Bank, 97 Ga. 634
(1895) ; Railway Co. v. Schaeffer, 59 Pa. 350 (I868).
SuRETYSHIP-LIAILITY

oF SuRETY

DncrLY

To

THIRD

PEnsos-An

injured pedestrian sued a contractor and his surety jointly under a contract
for the construction of a city sewer wherein the contractor and his surety
had agreed to hold the city harmless against any damage from personal
injuries growing out of the work.

Held: The surety could not be sued in

the first instance, but only after the liability of his principal or of the city
had been established. Owens v. Georgia Life Ins. Co. et al., 177 So. W. Z9
(Ky. 1915).

The liability of a surety to third persons is strictly interpreted and cannot be extended by implication beyond the terms of the contract. Sterling
v. Wolf, 163 Ill. 467 (i896). Most of the litigation occurs over building
contracts which contain a bond for the payment of the material and labor
used. There, in order to hold the surety directly liable to the beneficiaries,
there must be an express promise to pay for the material furnished. Peoples
Lumber Co. v. Gillard, 136 Cal. 55 (i92); Phila. v. Nichols Co., 214 Pa. 265
(i9o6). At least the contract must contain language sufficient to impose a
direct obligation to pay. Greenfield Ice Co. v. Parker, 159 Ind. 57i (1902).
If the contract does not disclose a primary intention to benefit the plaintiff,
he cannot recover from the surety in the first instance. Hart v. State, i2o
Ind. 83 (I889). In another class of cases, of which the principal case is
illustrative, where the surety has promised to indemnify the contractor against
loss or damage caused by negligence, the rule is practically the same. Unless
the contract expressly provides that it is taken out for the benefit of the
injured party, none of the cases hold that the injured party may, in the
first instance, proceed directly against the surety. Clark v. Bonsai, 157 N. C.
270 (i9ii).
Before a liability can be placed upon a surety a liability must
first be placed upon the obligor. Simons v. Gregory, I2O Ky. ii6 (r905).

RECENT CASES
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-An automobile driver who was run

down by a train had not brought his car to a stop before crossing the tracks.
Held: Failure to stop as well as to look and listen is not necessarily contributory negligence, but is a question of fact for the jury. Ft. Worth & D.
C. Rwy. Co. v. Alcorn, 178 S. W. 833 (Texas, 1915).
All courts hold that a traveler owes the duty of looking and listening.
Salter v. Utica & B. R. R. R. Co., 75 N. Y. 273 (1878). This applies whether it
be a pedestrian, Stewart v. N. Y. Railroad Co., 170 Mass. 430 (1898); or
one traveling in a vehicle. Noakes v. N. Y. R. R. Co., io6 N. Y. Supp. 522
(igog). The majority of courts, including the court in the principal case,
decline to extend the duty so as to include the actual halting of the vehicle,
but regard it as a mixed question of law and fact. Leavenworth R. R. Co.
v. Rice, io Kansas 426 (1872). It has been held that such would demand
more care than displayed even by the most prudent. Davis v. N. Y. C. &
H. R. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 4oo (1872); Duffy v. Chicago & N. W. Rwy. Co.,
It has also been held that this would be usurping the
32 Wis. 269 (1873).
jury's function. Dolan v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 71 N. Y. 287 (1877).
The minority view requires the actual stopping of the vehicle. Strong v.
Grand Trunk Rwy. Co., r56 Mich. 66 (igog) ; Henze v. St. Louis, Kansas City
& N. Rwy. Co., 71 Mo. 636 (i88o). Some decisions hold it imperative only
when the noise of the wagon prevents effective listening. Kelly v. Chicago
and Alton, 88 Mo. 534 (1885). The Pennsylvania courts endorse the
minority view. Failure to stop is negligence per se and a question for the
court. N. Pa. R. R. Co. v. Heileman, 49 Pa. 6o (1865). It has been held
that some circumstances might even require the leading of one's horses
across the track. Penna. R. R. Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 504 (1873). There is a
tendency in the courts to hold automobiles to a stricter observance of the
duty to stop than horses, because of the greater ease with which it can be
done.

Brommer v. Penna. R. R. Co., 179 Fed. 577 (.1910).

ToRTs-HIGHwAYs-LIABIITY OF CONTRACTOR WHEN COUNTY Is ExEmPT
-A contractor doing work on a county road left a pile of stones unlighted
and unguarded on the highway, and a traveler at night was injured thereby.
Held: The contractor was not liable. Ockerman v. Woodward, 178 S. W.
1100 (Ky. 19,5).
It is the general rule that in the absence of a statute a county is not
liable for defects in, or for the negligent construction of, a highway under
its control. This immunity is based on the ground that the county is a
mere arm of the state, a territorial division for governmental purposes and
so partakes of the immunity of the state. Smith v. Commissioners, 29 Ohio
C. C. 61o (igo5); Kelley v. Cumberland County, 229 Pa. 289 (1g1o). Nor
are the officers of the county liable personally. Templeton v. Beard, 74 S. E.
735 (S. Car. i912). But there is a dearth of authority as to the liability
of contractors doing work for the county. The Kentucky cases hold that a
contractor owes no duty where there is none imposed on the county, hence
no liability. Traction Company v. Grover, 123 S. W. 264 (Ky. igog);
Schneider v. Cahill, 127 S. W. 143 (Ky. igio). It has been held that even
though the county may not be liable, an independent contractor is, his liability not depending on the contract but upon a duty generally imposed by
law. Wade v. Gray, 6r So. x68 (Miss. 1913). The cases differ from those
holding cities and townships and their contractors liable for defective roads,
as municipal corporations have a general duty to safeguard their highways
and are not regarded as governmental subdivisions of the state.
TRADE-MARKS-EXCLUSIVE RIGHTs-An application for a trade-mark for
gin, consisting of a cat in boots with a bottle by its side, was opposed by the
owner of a mark which represented a cat on a barrell. Held: The design of
a cat was common to gin trade and no exclusive right to use it could be
maintained. lit re Bagots, 113 L. T. 67 (Eng. 1915).
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The term trade-mark is defined as a distinctive mark through which
the products of particular manufacturers or the vendible commodities of
particular merchants may be distinguished from those of others. Elgin
Watch Co. v. Illinois Co., i79 U. S. 665 (igoo). The exclusive right to the
use of a mark or device claimed as a trade-mark is founded on priority of
appropriation, but this is not so when the particular device has become a
common sign of the trade. Carrol & Sons v. McIlvain, 171 Fed. 125 (19o9) ;
58 UNIv. OF PENNA. L. Rxv. 115. In the principal case, where the name
for this kind of gin was "Old Tom Cordial", it was undisputed that the
defendant had been the originator of the idea of representing a tom cat on
the bottle labels, but it was also clear that other dealers in gin without
objection had adopted this device and pictured cats in different positions, io
that there was no exclusive right tq the use of a cat's figure. In accord with.
this, it has been held that the design of a white swan, used for many years
by flour manufacturers, was not subject to exclusive rights. Bulte v. Igleheart Bros., 137 Fed. 492 (i9o5) ; nor the number "6oo", which was commonly
used to designate the quality on oil barrels. Vacuum Oil Co. v. Climax Ref.
Co., 12o Fed. 254 (1903) ; nor the figure of a horse on packages of horse
salve. Bickmore Co. v. Karns Mfg. Co., 126 Fed. 573 (19o3). And where
tin tags of all colors had been in use by tobacco manufacturers for several
years, there is no exclusive right to a certain colored tag. Continental Tobacco Co. v. Larns & Co., 133 Fed. 727 (1904).

But while there is no

monopoly of the right to use the particular device, there is an exclusive right
limited to its representation in the same or substantially similar appearance,
style, or position. Bickmore Co. v. Karns Mfg. Co., 134 Fed. 833 (1905).
Likewise, if the use of the common design shows a studied intention to
imitate the competitor's design and confuse the public, it will be declared
an infringement. Lanahan v. Kissel Sons, 135 Fed. 899 (io5); Johnson v.

Seabury, 69 N. J. Eq. 696 (i9o5).

TRAD-NAMES-USE OF NAMEs-An individual candy manufacturer, with
a wide reputation, sold to a corporation his business and good will, together
with the privilege of using his name in the manufacture and sale of candy.
Held: He could not thereafter use his name in connection with the manufacture and sale of candy. Guth v. Guth Chocolate Co., 224 Fed. 932 (19I1).
The mere right to use a name is not assignable. Messer v. "The
Fadettes", i68 Mass. 140 (1897) ; but if a person has the right to use his
own name in connection with an article of trade, which he manufactures, he
may, on transferring the business, transfer the right to use his name. Higgins
Any trade-mark, including
Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462 (895).
a surname, may be sold with the business or establishment to which it is
incident, and the vendor may thereafter be enjoined from using that name
in that business. Le Page v. Russia Cement Co., 51 Fed. 943 (1892). It is
not upon the ground of the invasion of the trade-name adopted by another,
but by reason of the contract he has made, that he is deprived of the right
himself to use his name. Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page, 147 Mass. 2o6
(888). A man has a right to use his own name in connection with an
article which he manufactures, if he does so in good faith, though the effect
may be to confound the article to some extent, in the public mind, with an
article manufactured by some other person. Chemical Co. v. Myer, 31 Fed.
453 (1887); but a dishonest and fraudulent use of one's own name for the
purpose of deceiving the public will be prevented. Rogers v. Rogers, 17 C. C.
A. 576 (1895).

TRUSTS-BANK Dmosls-CoLLEcrio-A cheque which had been deposited in a bank for collection, was sent for payment to the drawee, who
charged the account of the maker and credited the account of the collecting
bank, but made no remittance. Two days later the drawee failed. Held:
The maker of the cheque was absolved from further liability on the obligation

RECENT CASES
for which the cheque was given. Planters Mercantile Co. v. Armour Packing
Co., 69 So. 293 (Miss. 1915).
Cheques deposited in a bank for collection do not at once become the
property of the bank; but the bank continues to be the agent of the depositor until the collection of the cheque, which remains, during that time, the
property of the depositor. Balach v. Frelinghuysen, i5 Fed. 675 (1896). As
agent of the depositor, the collecting bank is bound to exercise reasonable
care in selecting its sub-agents to receive payment on the cheque. It is not
reasonable care to select the drawee himself, and place the evidence of the
debt in his hands. Drovers National Bank v. Anglo-American Co., 117
Ill. ioo (1886). Where a cheque has been sent for payment directly to the
drawee, who has sufficient funds of the drawer to pay it, but neglects to do
so, and subsequently fails, the payee cannot thereafter recover the amount
of the cheque from the drawer. Wagner v. Cook, 167 Pa. 259 (895).
A
custom permitting a collecting bank to send a cheque for collection directly
to the drawee is unreasonable and will not be recognized by the courts.
Farley National Bank v. Pollock, 145 Ala. 321 (1905). In a few jurisdictions the rule is subject to the qualification that if the drawee bank is known
to be the only bank in the place, it is not negligence, per se, for the collecting bank to send the cheque directly to it for payment. Wilson v. Carlinville National Bank, 187 Ill. 222 (19oo). But see Winchester Milling Co. v.
Bank of Winchester, 12o Term. 225 (19o7).
TRUSTS-ORAL EVIDENc--LIMITATION ON ABSOLUTE GiFT-A testatrix
disposed of all her property to the appellant in terms amounting to an absolute
gift, but it was her intention that three of her relatives should receive certain
amounts out of the estate, of which the appellant was aware and promised
orally to do. Held: The estate was subject to a trust in favor of the
relatives. Ficke's Estate, 59 Pa. Super. Ct. 535 (915).

Despite the Statute of Frauds, it is settled both in England and this
country that where a testator makes a devise absolute in form but upon a
private understanding that the devisee will apply the estate to objects mentioned by the testator a trust arises, and this whether the promise was express
or implied from silence. Norris v. Frazer, 15 Eq. Rep. 318 (Eng. 1869);
Shields v. McAuley, 37 Fed. 302 (i888); Carver v. Todd, 48 N. J. E. p02
(i89i). The evidence, however, must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing.
Sherman v. Sandell, io6 Cal. 373 (1895) ; Ryder v. Ryder, 244 Ill. 297 (1Io).

While the law is thus settled with regard to testamentary dispositions,
the same harmony does not prevail where there is an absolute gift inter vizos
with an oral promise by the grantee to hold in trust. In England the courts
have decided that since the oral trust cannot be enforced because of the
Statute of Frauds, it is but equitable that the grantee should be compelled
to restore the property. Booth v. Turle, L R. 16 Eq. 182 (,Eng. 1873);
De La Rochefaucauld v. Bonstead, i Ch. i96 (Eng. 1897). In this country
the courts, while declaring the trust cannot be carried out, make no provision
for having the property reconveyed to the grantor. Savings Bank v. McMahon, 37 S. C. 309 (1892); Pavey v. Insurance Co., 56 Wis. 221 (1882). In
Massachusetts the grantor can recover from the grantee a fair value for the
land but not the land itself. Cromwell v. Norton, 79 N. E. 433 (Mass. i9o6).
Where it was the intention of the grantor to create a trust, but by accident
or mistake an absolute conveyance was made, equity will enforce the trust.
Barnard v. Flinn, 8 Ind. 204 (1856) ; Nevis v. Topfer, 121 Iowa, 433 (193o).
TRUSTS-RIGHT TO

FoLLow

TRUST FUNDS-A

trust company mingled a

trust fund with its general funds, the balance being always in excess of the
trust, and the cestui que trust sought to claim as a preferential creditor, the
company being insolvent. Held: The cestui que trust is not entitled to claim
the amount of the trust, as against others whose money went into the same
fund. Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co. (No. 2), 25o Pa.-378 (i9i5).
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Trust property can be followed so long as it can be identified and is not
in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. In re Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch.
Div. 696 (Eng. 1878); Commercial National Bank v. Armstrong, 39 Fed. 684
(1889); Breit v. Yeaton, ioi Ill. 242 (1881) ; Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 376
(1893); Thompson's Appeal, 22- Pa. I6 (853).
Most jurisdictions hold that
this applies to trust funds mingled with the trustee's general account. In re
Hallett, supra; Brennan v. Tillinghast, 2oI Fed. 6og (1913) ; Blair v. Hill, 163
N. Y. 672 (igoi) ; Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356 (i9io). But some courts
hold that money so mingled is incapable of sufficient identification and cannot
be followed. Bright v. King, 45 S. W. 508 (Ky. i898) ; Phillips v. Overfield,
ioo Mo. 466 (i89o) ; Carmany's Appeal, 166 Pa. 622 (1895). In general if
the trustee becomes insolvent the cestui que trust has no preference simply
because of the relationship and the" trust property must be accurately identified. Seiter v. Mowe, 182 Ill. 351 (1899) ; Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass. log
(i89o); Cavin v. Gleason, Io5 N. Y. 262 (1887). But in a few states it is
enough to show that the trust fund went into the insolvent's estate. Hopkins
v. Burr, 24 Colo. 502 (1898) ; Plow Co. v. Lamp, 8o Ia. 722 (i89o) ; Hunt v.
Smith, 58 N. J. Eq. 25 (i899). Many jurisdictions apply the same ru!e to
banks acting as trustees, as to individuals. Commissioners of Marquette v.
Wilkinson, i1g Mich. 655 (1899); Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104 (1902).
But because of the reason for allowing the cestui que trust to follow the
trust fund into the general funds of the individual trustee, the court in the
principal case distinguished the case of a bank or trust company.
TRusTs-SAL.E By TRUSTEE-APPLICATION OF PURCHASE MoNEY-The defendant purchased a number of shares of stock from a trustee who embezzled
the money. Held: The defendant, having determined that the trustee had
power to sell, was not bound to see that purchase money was properly
applied. Streater's Estate, 25o Pa. 328 (I915).
The principal case follows the prevailing rule that a trustee may sell the
personal property of an estate, especially if he have authority to change the
securities or vary the investments, and if he makes a sale in good faith, the
purchaser acquires a good title, although the trustee later misapplies the
money. Batchelder v. National Bank, I88 Mass. 25 (19o4) ; Spencer v. Weber,
163 N. Y. 493 (1goo). At common law the receipt of a trustee was always a
valid discharge, but in equity since the cestui que trust was regarded as the
true owner, the purchaser was obliged to get a receipt from him or see at his
peril that the purchase money was properly applied. Indiana Rwy. Co. v.
Swannell, 54 Ill. App. 260 (1894). Because of its unfairness and inconvenience
the common law rule has been abolished by statute in England. Trustees Act,
§ 2ol (i893); and in many states in this country, Kan. Gen. Stat., § 9702
(igog) ; Wis. Stat., § 2092 (1898). If the trust directs the land to be sold
for the payment of debts generally, the purchaser is not bound to see that the
purchase money is rightly applied. Conover v. Stathoff, 38 N. J. Eq. 55
(1884) ; Learned v. Tritch, 6 Col. 432 (I882) ; but if the trust provides for
the payment of specific and definite debts or legacies, the vendee does not
get a good title unless the proceeds go to pay such debts or legacies. Duffy
v. Calvert, 6 Gill, 487 (Md. 1848) ; St. Mary's Church v. Stockton, 8 N. J. Eq.
52o (1851). If the proceeds are not to be paid to the cestui que trust, but are
to be retained by the trustee for special purposes, the purchaser has no
burden to see that the money is properly applied. Guill v. Northern, 67 Ga.
345 (1881); Keister v. Scott, 61 Md. 507 (1883).
WILLS-REVOCATION

BY

SUBSEQUENT

INSTRUMENT-A

testator, by an

instrument intended as a subsequent will, expressly revoked the prior instrument. The second was invalid because of the incompetency of a subscribing
witness. Held: The former will was not revoked. Moore v. Rowlett, log
N. E. 682 (Ill. igis).

RECENT CASES

219

A revoking will must have all the formalities prescribed for the making
of a will. West v. West, 144 Mo. I19 (1898); Leard v. Askew, 114 Pac. 251
(Okla. 1911). Generally the mere executing of a subsequent will is not sufficient to establish revocation unless the prior will is expressly or impliedly
revoked. Smith v. Gorham, 152 Ill. App. 125 (igo9) ; Gordon v. Whitlock, 92
Va. 723 (1896). Under some statutes it has been held otherwise. Bruce v.
Sierra, 57 So. 709 (Ala. 1912). In most states a prior will is revoked by the
execution of a second, even though it never becomes active as a will, if the
later contains an express revocatory clause. Blackett v. Ziegler, 133 N. W.
9ol (Iowa, I91I) ; In re Peirce's Estate, 115 Pac. 835 (Wash. 191i). In some
states an inconsistent disposition has the same effect. Wabash R. Co. v.
Young, 154 Ind. 24 (igoo) ; Carpenter v. Miller's Exrs., 3 W. Va. 174 (1869).
But in others revocation, whether express or implied, becomes effective only
when the subsequent will becomes operative at the death of the testator.
Stetson v. Stetson, 200 Ill. 6oi (903); Bates v. Hacking, 29 R. I. (igo8).
See i Stimson Am. Statute Law, § 2673, and a comprehensive note in 28
Am. St. Rep. 344.

